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SAMI PAAVOLA
Peirce’s conception of abduction has many puzzling features. Some of
these puzzles follow from the fact that Peirce developed his theory of ab-
duction throughout his long career, and changed his views in some impor-
tant respects. This development should then be taken into account when
his multi-faceted conception of abduction is interpreted. One important
change was that, in his later writings, a guessing instinct, or an instinct
for finding good hypotheses, was an important aspect of abduction, in-
deed, a central element that made the originary character of abduction
understandable. Earlier, he had rejected this role explicitly.
The strong appeal to instinct raises, however, a fundamental problem
for his later view. It leads to a seemingly paradoxical view that new ideas
and hypotheses are products of an instinct (or an insight), and products of
an inference at the same time (Frankfurt 1958: 594; see also Fann 1970:
35; Anderson 1987: 32, 35; Roth 1988; Brogaard 1999; Burton 2000). Can
abduction be, at the same time, a form of reasoning and have its basis so
clearly in instinct? Usually it is thought that new ideas are products of an
imaginative faculty of human beings, which is a matter of psychology (or
maybe sociology), or contrary-wise, of a rational or rule-following proce-
dure, which would mean that one could develop some sort of a logic of
discovery; but not these two at the same time or with the same model. If
abduction relies on instinct, it is not a form of reasoning, and if it is a
form of reasoning, it does not rely on instinct.
In this article, I examine how it is interpreted that Peirce succeeded in
combining instinct and inference; and, more generally, how to see the re-
lationship between these two. I first present, briefly, some basic phases of
Peirce’s conception of abduction, and di¤ering characterizations that may
be found for instinct in Peirce’s writings. Then I will discuss other inter-
peters’ accounts of how Peirce combines instinct and inference. Finally
I present my own interpretation of this relationship and give my own
assessment. To foreshadow, I maintain that it is beneficial to make a
clear distinction between abductive inference and abductive instinct, and
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to develop these both further. I argue that although this interpretation
di¤ers from Peirce’s own conception, especially according to his later
view, it can be supported by Peirce’s own writings.
1. The evolution of Peirce’s conception of abduction
Peirce’s writings concerning abduction range over almost 50 years time,
so it is no wonder that they contain elements for various interpretations.1
It is customary to separate two periods in Peirce’s conceptions of abduc-
tion, although there was no abrupt change in his views (Burks 1946: 301;
Fann 1970: 9–10; Thagard 1981; Anderson 1986, 1987: 19–23; Flach and
Kakas 2000: 5–8; Paavola 2004b). In the early period (from the 1860s to
about the 1890s) abduction was seen by Peirce as an evidencing process,
i.e., as a weak kind of a syllogistic inference, di¤ering from deduction
and induction. A basic formulation of abduction is an inversion of de-
ductive, Barbara syllogism so that the minor premise is abduced from
the conclusion and the major premise. Abduction is, then, a weak form
of inference:
HYPOTHESIS [ABDUCTION]
Rule — All the beans from this bag are white.
Result — These beans are white.
9Case — These beans are from this bag.
(CP 2.623, 1878)
In the later period (about 1890s onwards) abduction was seen by Peirce
from a methodological viewpoint rather than as a relationship between
premises and a conclusion. Abduction is a first phase of inquiry with
which ideas are generated. A basic formula of abduction is quite similar
to the earlier formula:
The surprising fact, C, is observed; [cf. Result]
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, [cf. Rule]
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. [cf. Case]
(CP 5.189, 1903)
But, di¤ering from the evidential viewpoint, the methodological view-
point emphasizes that abduction is one phase in the process of inquiry;
hypotheses and ideas are generated with abduction and should then be
tested with deduction and induction (CP 6.469–6.473, 1908; CP 7.202–
219, 1901).
132 S. Paavola
Actually, a clearer change in Peirce’s views than from evidential to
methodological perspective concerned the role of instinct in abduction.
In his earlier view, he saw no need for, or indeed rejected a connection
between instinct and abductive inference, whereas, according to his later
view, the guessing instinct is a central element within abduction.
The early view is manifest at the end of his paper ‘A Theory of Proba-
ble Inference,’ from 1883. There, Peirce maintained that ‘all human
knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development of
our inborn animal instincts’ (CP 2.754, 1883; see also CP 6.416–6.417,
1878) but he argued that this fact does not a¤ect the validity of abductive
inference:
Others have supposed that there is a special adaptation of the mind to the uni-
verse, so that we are more apt to make true theories than we otherwise should
be. Now, to say that a theory such as these is necessary to explaining the validity
of induction and hypothesis [i.e. abduction] is to say that these modes of infer-
ence are not in themselves valid, but that their conclusions are rendered probable
by being probable deductive inferences from a suppressed (and originally un-
known) premiss. (CP 2.749, 1883; see also NEM 3: 227–228, 1866; CP 5.345,
1869)
According to his later view, abduction is supposed to be the way to
generate new ideas and suggestions for further inquiry and testing. Peirce
emphasized that abduction is a weak mode of inference coming close to,
or even being the same as guessing (HP 2: 878–879, 1900; CP 7.219,
1901; NEM 4: 319–320, c. 1906). But, despite its weakness, it is of utmost
importance because it is the only mode of inference that introduces new
ideas (CP 5.171, 1903; CP 5.590, 1903; CP 6.475, 1908). Yet abduction
is not supposed to be pure guessing, or a procedure based on pure chance
operations (Brogaard 1999: 130–131). This is where Peirce introduces the
need for instinct.
. . . [I]t is a primary hypothesis underlying all abduction that the human mind is
akin to the truth in the sense that in a finite number of guesses it will light upon
the correct hypothesis. Now inductive experience supports that hypothesis in a re-
markable measure. For if there were no tendency of that kind, if when a surpris-
ing phenomenon presented itself in our laboratory, we had to make random shots
at the determining conditions, trying such hypotheses as that the aspect of the
planets had something to do with it, or what the dowager empress had been doing
just five hours previously, if such hypotheses had as good a chance of being true
as those which seem marked by good sense, then we never could have made any
progress in science at all. (CP 7.220, 1901; also CP 1.80–1.81, c. 1896; HP 2: 900–
901, 1901; CP 5.591, 1903)
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New ideas could not have been produced by chance operations; there
simply has not been enough time for that in human history. So, according
to this, one must suppose some sort of an instinct that helps human beings
to find true hypotheses, otherwise the progress of science would be inex-
plicable. Peirce also maintains that it actually seems to be the case that we
humans have this kind of an instinct. This guessing instinct is not claimed
to be infallible, but still good enough to help find right hypotheses much
more e¤ectively than pure chance operations would allow (CP 6.476,
1908; CP 7.220, 1901). So there is a need for an ‘abductive instinct’ and
also reasons for thinking that we actually have this kind of an instinct.
Peirce’s later view of abduction can be interpreted so that it means
either the way new hypotheses are generated or formed in the first place
(the ‘generative’ sense), or, in addition to this generative sense, the way
these hypotheses are evaluated in a preliminary way (the ‘evaluative’
sense) (see Nickles 1980: 18–23; Kapitan 1992; Paavola 2004b). In both
of these versions, abductive instinct is especially important in the genera-
tive phase of discovery (cf. Shanahan 1986). Instinct helps researchers to
find good hypotheses although there then can be ‘reasoned’ considera-
tions (like questions concerning the economy of research) besides these
instinctive ones (CP 7.220, 1901).
2. Forms of abductive instinct
It is not clear what Peirce means by abductive, guessing instinct. In vari-
ous writings, Peirce gives somewhat di¤erent bases and characterizations
for it. According to Shanahan (1986), Peirce o¤ers three distinct but inter-
woven grounds for justifying abductive instinct: (1) naturalistic, (2) ideal-
istic (or metaphysical), and (3) theistic justification, which give three basic
ways for understanding the nature of abductive instinct. I first present all
these briefly, and then analyze various accounts of the ‘naturalistic’ basis.
1. A naturalistic basis means that Peirce likens abductive instinct to
those instincts that animals possess for getting food and reproducing
(HP 2: 900–901, 1901). If animals have innate tendencies that help
them to survive in their environments, why not to assume that we as
human beings have analogously innate tendencies for finding correct
theories? This kind of an instinct would obviously have strong adap-
tive value for us.
2. For Peirce, the naturalistic arguments were closely linked to idealistic
grounds for abductive instinct; ‘It is somehow more than a mere fig-
ure of speech to say that nature fecundates the mind of man with
134 S. Paavola
ideas which, when those ideas grow up, will resemble their father,
Nature’ (CP 5.591, 1903). This is in line with Peirce’s synechism
(which he developed especially after 1890s), according to which ev-
erything is continuous (Shanahan 1986: 459–462): Mind and matter
are not entirely distinct elements but ‘all phenomena are of one char-
acter, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more
material and regular’ (EP 2: 2, 1893; see also Bergman and Paavola
2003, entry: ‘Synechism’). Similarly, it can be argued that there is no
sharp line between instinct and inference; ‘instinct and reason shade
into one another by imperceptible gradations’ (NEM 3: 1114). The
metaphysical ground is a rather vague argument for the idea that if
the human mind is developed under those laws that govern the uni-
verse, it is reasonable to suppose that the mind has a tendency to
find true hypotheses concerning this universe. In this way, general
considerations concerning the universe, strictly philosophical consid-
erations, all but demonstrate that if the universe conforms, with any
approach to accuracy, to certain highly pervasive laws, and if man’s
mind has been developed under the influence of those laws, it is to be
expected that he should have a natural light, or light of nature, or in-
stinctive insight, or genius, tending to make him guess those laws
aright, or nearly aright. (CP 5.604, 1903; cf. CP 6.10, 1891). This nat-
ural light, or il lume naturale, is no guarantee of the truth by itself,
but it is supposed to be an essential factor that helps us to find true
theories (CP 1.80, c. 1896; CP 1.630, 1898).
3. In some of his writings, these metaphysical grounds for abduction
were also interwoven with what can be called theistic arguments. Ret-
roduction [i.e. abduction] gives hints that come straight from our dear
and adorable Creator. We ought to labour to cultivate this Divine
privilege. It is the side of human intellect that is exposed to influence
from on high. (NEM 3: 206, 1911; see also CP 8.212, c. 1905; CP
6.476–6.477, 1908; MS 843 [variant]: 7)
These theistic arguments are rather indefinite. Shanahan concludes that,
according to Peirce,
[p]resumably God is a rational creator; man is made to God’s image; therefore
man has within him the ability to contemplate and intellectually penetrate to
some degree the rational plan at work in nature, i.e., God’s thoughts expressed
in laws of nature. (Shanahan 1986: 464)
This account is intervowen with the Kantian idea that processes of na-
ture and processes of thought are alike (CP 3.422, 1892). These theistic
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arguments also have a‰nities to Peirce’s idea of agapastic evolution, i.e.,
to an idea that the ‘law of love’ is operative in cosmos (EP 1: 352–371,
1893; Kim and Cunningham 2003: 310). According to Peirce, evolution
by fortuitous variation (‘tychastic evolution’), or evolution by mechanical
necessity (‘anancastic evolution’) is not enough; we need agapistic evolu-
tion (EP 1: 362, 1893). These three variations of evolution also concern
the development of thought.
The agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tenden-
cies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by the mere force
of circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by an immediate attraction for
the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it, by the power
of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind. (EP 1: 364, 1893)
One aspect of agapastic evolution, then, is that there is alleged to be some
sort of a ‘continuity between man’s mind and the Most High’ (ibid.).
Varieties of naturalistic grounds
Peirce’s naturalistic grounds for abductive instinct can also be seen to
contain various ingredients. Or, various writings of Peirce concerning ab-
ductive instinct can be seen to have di¤ering emphases, especially when
interpreted through the eyes of a modern reader. For Peirce himself, these
various aspects of abductive instinct are more or less meant as alternative
ways for describing the same phenomenon, but it is useful to distinguish
these characterizations. I want to discern three main varieties of natural-
istic abductive instinct: a) ‘adaptive instinct,’ b) ‘perceptual insight,’ and
c) ‘guessing with non-conscious clues.’ These varieties overlap each other,
but if di¤erently emphasized, they lead to quite di¤erent interpretations
of the proposed abductive instinct.
a) Peirce o¤ers various evolutionary or adaptive arguments for the
guessing instinct. Peirce likens this ‘adaptive instinct’ to those basic
instincts that animals have for survival:
Besides, you cannot seriously think that every little chicken, that is hatched, has to
rummage through all possible theories until it lights upon the good idea of picking
up something and eating it. On the contrary, you think the chicken has an innate
idea of doing this; that is to say, that it can think of this, but has no faculty of
thinking anything else. The chicken you say pecks by instinct. But if you are going
to think every poor chicken endowed with an innate tendency toward a positive
truth, why should you think that to man alone this gift is denied? . . . In short, the
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instincts conducive to assimilation of food, and the instincts conducive to repro-
duction, must have involved from the beginning certain tendencies to think truly
about physics, on the one hand, and about psychics, on the other. (CP 5.591,
1903; also CP 6.531, 1901; CP 7.39–7.40, c. 1907)
According to this argument, the human being should have some innate
tendencies for finding true theories, especially concerning physics and
‘psychics’ otherwise he or she would not have succeeded in the environ-
ment. These biological arguments were closely connected to metaphysical
arguments for the abductive instinct, as already given: Nature is alleged
to ‘fecundate’ the mind of the man with the true theories (ibid.).
The arguments for innate tendencies were intertwined with the idea of
habit change through experience. I will not analyze, in detail, Peirce’s
conception of evolution or the evolutionary theory which has both Dar-
winian and Lamarckian elements in it, and which is closely linked to his
evolutionary metaphysics (see e.g., CP 6.287–6.317, 1893; Roth 1988). At
any rate, Peirce’s conception of instinct was quite broad. Instincts can, ac-
cording to Peirce, undergo modification and change by new experience
(CP 1.648, 1898; EP 2: 467, 1913). So, besides innate tendencies, instincts
also cover learned habits.
If I may be allowed to use the word ‘‘habit,’’ without any implication as to the
time or manner in which it took birth, so as to be equivalent to the corrected
phrase ‘‘habit or disposition,’’ that is, as some general principle working in a
man’s nature to determine how he will act, then an instinct, in the proper sense
of the word, is an inherited habit, or in more accurate language, an inherited dis-
position. But since it is di‰cult to make sure whether a habit is inherited or is due
to infantile training and tradition, I shall ask leave to employ the word ‘‘instinct’’
to cover both cases. (CP 2.170, c. 1902)
b) In his famous, 1903 Pragmatism lectures Peirce likens the guessing
instinct to insight and perception. So on this approach, the guessing
instinct is a form of a ‘perceptual insight’ rather than instinct as such.
Peirce himself describes the relationship between insight and instinct:
It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the logical situation
— the freest from all questionable admixture — is to say that man has a certain
Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough not
to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the Thirdnesses, the gen-
eral elements, of Nature. An Insight, I call it, because it is to be referred to the
same general class of operations to which Perceptive Judgments belong. This Fac-
ulty is at the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the instincts
of the animals in its so far surpassing the general powers of our reason and for its
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directing us as if we were in possession of facts that are entirely beyond the reach
of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small liability to error; for though it
goes wrong oftener than right, yet the relative frequency with which it is right is
on the whole the most wonderful thing in our constitution. (CP 5.173, 1903)
According to these lectures, abduction has close a‰nities to percep-
tion and perceptual judgments. In a famous passage, Peirce wrote that
abduction
. . . shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation be-
tween them; or, in other words, our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are
to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they di¤er
in being absolutely beyond criticism. (CP 5.181, 1903)
Perceptual judgments are supposed to be similar processes to abductive
inference, except that processes of forming perceptual judgments are sub-
conscious, and not amenable to logical criticism (ibid.). Reversible fig-
ures, i.e. visual data that can be interpreted in several ways, are border-
line cases between perceptual judgments and abductive inferences because
they show that percepts contain inferential or interpretative elements (see
CP 5.183–5.184, 1903; also Hanson 1958; Burton 2000: 151).
If perception, then, is dependent on abductive inference, abduction, on
the other hand, is dependent on perception. After presenting the formula
for abduction (CP 5.189, 1903; or see above), Peirce continues:
Thus, A cannot be abductively inferred, or if you prefer the expression, cannot be
abductively conjectured until its entire content is already present in the premiss,
‘‘If A were true, C would be a matter of course.’’ (ibid.)
And this means that ‘all conceptions must be given substantially in per-
ception’ (CP 5.191, 1903). So accordingly, perception is a precondition
for abductive inference.
c) In the paper, ‘Guessing,’ Peirce describes in a lively way how the
‘guessing instinct’ of humans can operate (Peirce 1929 [or MS 687]2).
Peirce admits: ‘There are, indeed, puzzles, and one might well say
mysteries, connected with the mental operation of guessing — yes —
more than one’ (Peirce 1929: 269 [CP 7.39, c. 1907]).
In this paper Peirce proceeds to o¤er, explicitly, ‘two principles which I
have been led to conjecture furnish at least a partial explanation of the
mystery that overhangs this singular guessing instinct.’ (ibid.: 281 [CP
7.46, c. 1907]). One of these is the idealistic (or metaphysical) argument,
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already discussed above, that ‘man’s mind, having been developed under
the influence of the laws of nature, for that reason naturally thinks some-
what after nature’s pattern.’ (ibid.: 269 [CP 7.39, c. 1907]) The other one is
that we often derive from observation strong intimations of truth, without being
able to specify what were the circumstances we had observed which conveyed
those intimations. (ibid.: 282 [CP 7.46, c. 1907])
This is a third variety of the naturalistic abductive instinct that I call
‘guessing with non-conscious clues.’
Peirce delineates this form of the guessing instinct by telling a story
how he himself operated as a detective by catching a crook who had sto-
len his valuable watch and an overcoat on a boat trip (Peirce 1929; see
Eco and Sebeok 1983). As Peirce says, this story is anecdotal, but he
maintains that it is a true story. In any case, it provides one form of
Peirce’s guessing instinct. I am not going to describe all the incidents in-
volved in this story. One key event, however, was that Peirce asked all
waiters who were suspects, for the theft, to the deck to stand in a row.
He was hoping to gain some clues about the culprit.
I went from one end of the row to the other, and talked a little to each one, in as
dégagé a manner as I could, about whatever he could talk about with interest, but
would least expect me to bring forward, hoping that I might seem such a fool that
I should be able to detect some symptom of his being the thief. (Peirce 1929: 271)
This procedure was not successful, but he felt he had to get his belongings
back, especially the watch he had gotten from his workplace for the U.S.
Coast Survey. So he had to use his instinct for guessing:
When I had gone through the row I turned and walked from them, though not
away, and said to myself, ‘‘Not the least scintilla of light have I got to go upon.’’
But thereupon my other self (for our own communings are always dialogues), said
to me, ‘‘But you simply must put your finger on the man. No matter if you have
no reason, you must say whom you will think to be the thief.’’ I made a little loop
in my walk, which had not taken a minute, and as I turned toward them, all
shadow of doubt had vanished. (ibid.)
Later, it turned out that he had chosen the right person. The point is that
he recognized no clues or signs of the culprit, but still guessed right; and
was even certain that he got it right. Peirce was not able to persuade the
culprit to return his things, so he had to go to a detective’s o‰ce with his
suspicions, and ask them to shadow this suspect. After he had told his
suspicions, Mr. Bangs [a detective in the o‰ce] said:
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‘‘What makes you think he [this particular waiter] has stolen your watch?’’
‘‘Why,’’ said I [Peirce], ‘‘I have no reason whatever for thinking so; but I am en-
tirely confident that it is so.’’ (ibid.: 273)
But, on the other hand, when trying to give an explanation for these
phenomena, Peirce refers to psychological experiments that he had
carried out with Joseph Jastrow in the 1880s, which showed that people
are able to perceive changes of stimulus (pressure in their fingertips)
even when they are not conscious of these changes, i.e. to notice (or
‘guess’) changes of stimulus, by using subconscious clues, more often
than would be expected by pure chance. Peirce maintains that self-
consciousness can even weaken this kind of a performance, and instinct
works better spontaneously.
While I was going through the row, chatting a little with each, I held myself in as
passive and receptive a state as I could. When I had gone through the row I made
a great e¤ort to detect in my consciousness some symptoms of the thief, and this
e¤ort, I suppose, prevented my success. But then finding I could detect nothing I
said to myself, ‘‘Well, anyway, I must fasten on someone, though it be but a ran-
dom choice,’’ and instantly I knew which of the men it was. (ibid.: 281)
This third form of the guessing instinct has close a‰nities to ‘percep-
tual insight’ (item 2 above). But, whereas in Pragmatism lectures from
1903 Peirce likens the guessing instinct to perception and perceptual judg-
ments as such, in this third form, small observational symptoms and clues
which are not even consciously recognized, are emphasized.
3. The relationship between instinct (or insight) and inference
How then, did Peirce manage to combine abduction as a mode of infer-
ence with the idea that it is at the same time crucially dependent on in-
stinct, or insight. One answer is to say that Peirce did not succeed in this.
Braithwaite has maintained that actually Peirce di¤ers from the ‘ortho-
dox’ account only verbally, i.e. by calling an act of insight, reasoning
(Braithwaite 1934: 509–510; see also Frankfurt 1958). So according to
this view, the process of discovery is not amenable to logic, but is a mat-
ter of psychology (or sociology, history, and so on). There are some pas-
sages of Peirce which may be interpreted to support this view:
Any novice in logic may well be surprised at my calling a guess an inference.
It is equally easy to define inference so as to exclude or include abduction. But
all the objects of logical study have to be classified; and it is found that there is
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no other good class in which to put abduction but that of inferences. (HP 2: 899,
1901)
This argument is fortified when it is noticed that, in the formulations of
abduction, the hypothesis or the idea is already in the premises. Abduc-
tion (as a guessing instinct) is supposed to be a way of generating novel
ideas and hypotheses, whereas in the inferential formulas of abduction
the idea or the hypothesis in question is already supposed to be known
(e.g. Frankfurt 1958: 594; Kapitan 1990: 499; Ho¤mann 1999: 278–9).
So it seems that abduction as an instinct and abduction as an inference
are meant for di¤erent purposes. At most, abduction as an inference is a
way of evaluating, in a preliminary way, those ideas that abduction as an
instinct has produced for the inquirer (see also Nickles 1980: 23–25).
And, according to this argument, this is not much di¤erent from the or-
thodox view (e.g., from the traditional hypothetico-deductive model of
inquiry) where the invention of hypotheses is the area of instinct and psy-
chology, and logic and reasoning deal only with the subsequent evalua-
tion of these hypotheses (Kapitan 1992).
Many Peirce scholars have, however, rejected the interpretation that
Peirce only called creative insight or guessing instinct an inference. At
least Peirce himself was aiming at something else (Fann 1970: 36). This
position can be backed up by various quotations. When talking about
Speculative Rhetoric or Methodeutic, he wrote:
. . . after the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be no se-
rious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological mat-
ter, observations of how we think, and the like. The regulation has served its end;
why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic
practically useful? But while the justice of this must be admitted, it is also to be
borne in mind that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take
place . . . (CP 2.107, c. 1902, emphasis added; Fann 1970: 36)
Or:
It must be remembered that abduction, although it is very little hampered by logi-
cal rules, nevertheless is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problemati-
cally or conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly definite logical
form. (CP 5.188, 1903, emphasis added; Anderson 1987: 33)
There are several interpretations of how Peirce himself managed, or
thought he managed, to combine instinct and inference together. Accord-
ing to Fann, Peirce discussed both psychological aspects and logical as-
pects of discovery, but the intent was to keep them separate. So when
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Peirce wrote about ‘insight’ or ‘the a‰nity of mind with nature,’ he was
talking about psychological matters, not logical (Fann 1970: 35–38).
Similarly, Burks has suggested that when Peirce used words, such as ‘in-
sight’, and ‘instinct,’ he was talking about human’s logica utens, that is,
an undeveloped theory of logic, or practical ways of making inferences.
This logica utens can then be developed with logica docens, that is, with
a critical and scientific theory of logic (Burks 1946: 302–303). Burks ad-
mits that Peirce himself did not use this distinction between logica utens
and logica docens in relationship to abduction but, according to Burks, it
makes Peirce’s ideas more tenable.
It seems, however, that Peirce himself, in his later writings, did not
keep instinct so separate from logic, at least from that part of logic that
he called ‘‘Methodeutic’’ (see MS 633: 3, 1909; cf. Paavola 2004b). In-
stinct was rather supposed to play an essential role in abduction, also in
the sense of logica docens:
The reason for accepting the Retroductive [i.e., Abductive] conclusion, is that
man must trust to his power of getting at the truth simply because it is all he has
to guide him; and moreover when we look at the instincts of various animals, we
are struck with wonder at how they lead those creatures toward rational behav-
iour. (NEM 3: 203–204, 1911)
So abduction is sometimes characterized by Peirce as the same as the pro-
cess of instinctive reason: ‘. . . by Retroduction . . . that is to say, by the
spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason . . .’ (CP 6.475, 1908)
There are more recent interpreters of abduction who maintain that in-
stinct (or insight) is an important aspect of abduction, but in the sense
that it is one element within abduction. Accordingly, novel ideas and hy-
potheses are suggested by instinctual (or perceptual) process, but not
everything suggested is inferred abductively, so there is a need for close
interaction with inferential and instinctual elements in abduction (e.g.,
Kapitan 1990: 503–507; 1992: 7–11; 1997: 481–484). This interpretation
has its basis especially in Peirce’s 1903 lectures on pragmatism, where
Peirce emphasizes a close a‰nity of abduction to perception and percep-
tual judgments. Ho¤mann has supported this interpretation by separating
inferential and perceptive elements in abduction (Ho¤mann 1999). Per-
ceptive elements are the creative side of abduction. ‘The explaining idea
emerges in perceiving facts and experiences, and not in the conclusion of
an inference’ (Ho¤mann 1999: 279). The form of inference is abductive,
but the creative part is how to get the hypothesis to the second premise,
and this is not the question of the inferential side but of the perceptive
side. It might then be proposed that the perceptive aspect is responsible
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for the discovery in the generative sense, and the inferential aspect in eval-
uative sense (in a preliminary way, i.e., if the hypothesis is worth further
inquiry and testing).
According to Douglas R. Anderson, insight and inference cannot, how-
ever, be separated in abduction. He clearly defends the view that, for
Peirce, abduction is ‘. . . both an insight and an inference. This is a fact
to be explained, not to be explained away . . . Peirce quite intentionally
conjoined insight and inference in his description of abduction’ (Ander-
son 1987: 33).
I agree with Anderson that this seems, at least, to be Peirce’s own over-
all intention in his later writings. Usually Peirce himself did not want to
make any sharp distinction between the elements within abduction, and
instinct and inference ‘shade into’ each other, without any clear separat-
ing line (cf. CP 5.181, 1903). But it is not easy to see how Peirce thinks
that this can be done. Anderson gives various arguments for this interpre-
tation (ibid.: 32–50). He maintains that the logical form of abduction
(that the hypothesis searched for is already in the premises) does not pre-
clude abduction as a logic of discovery. Anderson also argues that, if in-
stinct is not deterministic (i.e., that it would determine our guesses), it
leaves room for logical form. Instinct is supposed to be an ability that is
a necessary, but not a su‰cient condition for abduction (ibid.: 36–37).
But these arguments are problematic. Even though instinct is not sup-
posed to be deterministic, still, if this instinct is a central factor for help-
ing us humans to find good hypotheses, it seems that, in this sense, abduc-
tion is not just a matter of logic any more, but rather a matter of
psychology.
From Peirce’s point of view, it is important that insight or instinct does
not mean an unmediated intuition (Anderson 1987: 37–39). In contrast to
intuition, abduction is fallible, it requires work by the investigator, and it
needs contextual knowledge and experience to begin with (ibid.). Abduc-
tion combines compulsion, control and free play: ‘Abduction is inference
because the agent is free to control his reasoning and it is insight because
it allows ideas to suggest other ideas’ (ibid.: 44; cf. also Peirce’s ideas of
‘Play of Musement,’ CP 6.452–6.465, 1908). A central element of reason-
ing is that it is deliberate and self-controlled (I will come back to this in
the next section), and this creates a tension between instinct and infer-
ence; it is typically thought that inference is something that is under con-
scious control of the inquirer whereas instincts force us without conscious
control (see Kapitan 1992: 8). But Peirce’s idea seems to be that, on one
hand, to us humans instinct can be under some control, and on the other
hand, with abductive inference the element of control is not so strong
as with other forms of reasoning (see Burton 2000). So abduction can
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be seen as a borderline case, which is ‘the closest reasoning gets to non-
reasoning’ (Anderson 1987: 42; see MS 831: 13–14). The guessing instinct
combines elements that are at the same time compelled and under our
control:
The first answer we naturally give to this question is that we cannot help accepting
the conjecture at such a valuation as that at which we do accept it; whether as a
simple interrogation, or as more or less Plausible, or, occasionally, as an irresist-
ible belief. But far from constituting, by itself, a logical justification such as it
becomes a rational being to put forth, this pleading, that we cannot help yielding
to the suggestion, amounts to nothing more than a confession of having failed to
train ourselves to control our thoughts. It is more to the purpose, however, to urge
that the strength of the impulse is a symptom of its being instinctive. (CP 6.476,
1908)
For man, instinct is partly conscious; it is ‘always partially controlled
by the deliberate exercise of imagination and reflexion’ (CP 7.381 n. 19,
c. 1902). According to Peirce, there is some sort of a continuum from an-
imal instinct that is determinate and well adapted for certain purposes, to
human instinct that is more flexible but at the same time more fallible
(EP 2: 467–468, 1913), and finally to reasoning that is fallible but more
amenable to novel situations (see CP 6.497, c. 1906). So it seems that, ac-
cording to Peirce, instinct and abductive inference can more or less merge
if the special characteristics of both of them are taken into account; ‘Rea-
son is a sort of instinct’ (EP 2: 472, 1913; see also EP 2: 464).
I maintain that there is still at least one possible way of seeing the con-
nection between instinct and inference through Peirce’s writings; this in-
terpretation develops abduction as a form of inference that is essential in
discovery. On the other hand, it is advantageous to analyze those pro-
cesses that are similar to inference but not inference in the proper sense;
and these processes are closely related to instinct. According to this inter-
pretation, abductive inference and the guessing instinct (or di¤erent forms
of the guessing instinct) can be seen as separate but closely analogous
processes. Although Peirce himself did not keep this distinction in his later
writings, it is reasonable to do so, and there are also good arguments,
from Peirce himself, for doing so. For this reason, I will next analyze ab-
ductive inference, as distinct from abductive instinct.
4. The nature of abductive inference
I maintain that Peirce need not have merged inference and instinct in his
later writings. This view of inference is in line with Peirce’s early view (CP
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2.749, 1883), but there are also many passages around the turn of the cen-
tury that support this perspective. According to these, reasoning is delib-
erate and controlled (see also Brogaard 1999), for example:
Reasoning, properly speaking, cannot be unconsciously performed. A mental op-
eration may be precisely like reasoning in every other respect except that it is per-
formed unconsciously. But that one circumstance will deprive it of the title of rea-
soning. For reasoning is deliberate, voluntary, critical, controlled, all of which it
can only be if it is done consciously. (CP 2.182, c. 1902; see also HP 2: 891, 1901)
Peirce continues,
[t]his does not imply that we must be aware of the whole process of the mind
in reasoning or, indeed, of any portion of it [—] all that is necessary is that we
should, in each case, compare premisses and conclusion, and observe that the re-
lation between the facts expressed in the premisses involves the relation between
facts implied in our confidence in the conclusion. (CP 2.183, c. 1902)
So reasoning requires that the premises be consciously recognized, and if
premises or processes involved are unconscious, it means that this kind of
an operation is not reasoning in a proper sense (CP 5.108, 1903; see also
HP 2: 900, 1901; CP 4.476, c. 1903).
Accordingly, it may be maintained that abduction as a form of infer-
ence should be developed without appealing to instinct. Abductive infer-
ence is a weak form of inference with which possible or plausible candi-
date hypotheses are drawn by using consciously explicated premises (see
Paavola 2004a, 2004b). A paradigmatic example of abductive reasoning
is a detective’s reasoning (see Fann 1970: 56–59; Eco and Sebeok 1983;
Niiniluoto 1999), where various, and minute clues help to delimit and
instigate the search for hypotheses, and where the goal is to find such a
pattern to which all the relevant information and clues can be fitted (cf.
Hanson 1958, 1965; Thagard and Shelley 1997). This does not require
necessarily an appeal to instinct, although the detective can also use in-
stinctual clues (see the next chapter). Abduction can be made stronger
without instinct, if the whole methodological process, and the way in-
quirers are able to strategically use all the information available (espe-
cially clue-like signs) is taken into account. Abductive reasoning strategies
can guide the process, and also the way in which premises are searched
for. According to this approach, abductive inference starts from small de-
tails and characteristics, and the goal is to find a hypothesis that would
explain these details ‘as a matter of course’ (CP 5.189, 1903; EP 2: 287,
1903). Clues and minute details give hints and suggestions for hypotheses
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(CP 2.755, c. 1905; Burton 2000). So, typically ideas are not searched for
in relationship to only one anomalous phenomenon (although the basic
formulas of abduction suggest so) but a mass of facts is taken into ac-
count at the same time (Paavola 2004a; see also Thagard and Shelley
1997).
I maintain that abduction as a pure form of inference is a good starting
point for understanding abductive instinct, in contrast to the position that
instinct is a good basis for understanding inference. Abduction as a form
of inference means that elements and processes of it must be carefully an-
alyzed. A risk with instinct is that it gives a name for processes that are
treated as somewhat mysterious, or which have no proper explanation
(cf. CP 6.530–6.531, 1901). In this sense ‘instinct’ merely amounts to giv-
ing a name for those processes that we do not understand; without pro-
viding any additional reasons, or evidence for this ‘instinct’ as a distin-
guishable, or causally important entity. Peirce’s idealistic and theistic
justifications for abduction can be interpreted so that operations of mind
and operations of nature are somehow analogous; one might then try to
explicate this analogy further. But this move leads easily to a rather mys-
terious interpretation which asserts that human beings can find fruitful
hypotheses because they have the ‘guessing instinct,’ and does not clarify
the situation at all. This mysterious guessing power is assumed in order to
explain how we humans have managed to find true theories, but this
guessing power in itself is not analyzed any further. But I would maintain
that the analysis of inferential processes also provides ingredients for a
better understanding of the abductive instinct.
5. The nature of abductive instinct
I have maintained that Peirce’s appeal to instinct leads easily to a rather
mysterious view of abduction, especially in his idealistic and theistic justi-
fications for abduction, but also in the naturalistic accounts, if they are
not analyzed further. But how are these operations of mind that are anal-
ogous to abductive inference supposed to operate? Already in his early
writings, Peirce had stated, analogously to his later writings, that such
things as emotions, sensations and conceptions are similar to, or closely
related to hypothesis (i.e. to abduction) (W 1: 289, 1865; W 1: 471–472,
1866; W 1: 491, 1866; W 1: 516, 1866; CP 5.291–5.292, 1868; CP 2.643,
1878; CP 2.712, 1883; CP 6.145, 1892). I am not, however, so much ana-
lyzing these early writings, but inquiring how, through his later writings,
the guessing instinct and perceptual judgment can be seen as abductive.
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Abduction can be seen to be operative at the level of inference but also at
the ‘lower’ levels (cf. W 1: 491, 1866; MS 939: 1–4, 1905).
But what are those elements of abductive inference that can be seen
as operative in abductive instinct? I maintain that what makes these both
processes ‘abductive,’ is that they both have their basis in ‘weak’ signs
(i.e., clue-like signs) that merely suggest their conclusions or what follows
from them. Abduction is near to guessing. But it is not a random process;
it deals with those ways to reach a conclusion that are better than pure
chance, that is, how to get good guesses. A basic secret for this is the
meaning of clues (which phenomena and experience o¤er), and how these
clues are operative in making good guesses. Peirce describes a situation of
using minute indications as clues for ‘intuition’:
A stranger with whom I am dealing may make an impression of being dis-
honest owing to indications too slight for me to know what they are. Yet the im-
pression may be well founded. Such results are usually set down to ‘‘intuition.’’
Though inferential in their nature, they are not exactly inferences. (EP 2: 11–12,
1895)
According to this interpretation, Peircean abductive instinct (like ab-
ductive inference) has its basis on small, clue-like signs and the result is a
hypothetical idea or interpretation. But in contrast to inference, instinct
means that ‘premises’ or ‘inferences’ are not deliberately or consciously
stated, and the relationship between ‘premises’ and the guess is an asso-
ciative connection rather than reasoning. Hence, (1) abductive instinct
(or guess) starts from weak signs that instigate the search, and (2) the re-
sult is also basically taken as ‘weak’, i.e. as a hypothetical suggestion. The
suggestive starting points can be minute, but there has to be something;
abduction does not start from scratch. Peirce is opposing unmediated in-
tuition (Anderson 1987: 37–39), and this means that there have to be some
signs to start the process. Facts or surprising phenomena suggest the
theory or the idea (see e.g. EP 2: 287, 1903; CP 5.144–5.145, 1903; CP
8.209, c. 1905). Human beings, especially when they are well acquainted
with the subject-area in question, are, to varying degrees, good at recog-
nizing clues, and using these clues and other information in searching for
new ideas. This account is present in Peirce’s detective story concerning
the guessing instinct (see above). On the one hand Peirce describes the op-
eration of the guessing instinct as if there were no reasons for his guess; he
did not notice any clues of the crook while he was observing the suspects.
On the other hand, the point of this story was that people can derive
‘from observation[,] strong intimations of truth’ without being conscious
of it. As I interpret this, it does not mean that Peirce had no reasons for
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his guess, but that he had no consciously recognized reasons or intima-
tions for it (see also Eco and Sebeok 1983: 18; Burton 2000: 154–155).
The result of activity of the abductive instinct is basically a guess, i.e., a
conjectural hypothesis. Abduction merely suggests that something may be
(CP 5.171–5.172, 1903; see also Anderson 1987: 34–35; Paavola 2004b)
also in the case of instinct. According to Peirce, the acceptance of the
hypothesis can range ‘from a mere expression in the interrogative mood’
to ‘uncontrollable inclination to believe,’ but, in all cases, the result is a
plausible hypothesis (CP 6.469, 1908). And plausibility means that the in-
quirer has some (weak) reasons for regarding the hypothesis favorably
(see CP 8.222, c. 1910). Also in those cases, as in Peirce’s detective story,
where the inquirer is subjectively very confident that the guess is true and
yet is unable to specify the grounds, it is still guessing.
Not only the guessing instinct, but also perceptual judgment is abduc-
tive in form (CP 5.181, 1903). According to Peirce, perception can be an-
alyzed with a formula that is similar to abduction (see also Ho¤mann
1999: 284):
A well-recognized kind of object, M, has for its ordinary predicates P[1], P[2],
P[3], etc., indistinctly recognized.
The suggesting object, S, has these same predicates, P[1], P[2], P[3], etc.
Hence, S is of the kind M. (CP 8.64, 1891)
This sequence is abductive in form, but ‘[i]n perception, the conclusion
has the peculiarity of not being abstractly thought, but actually seen, so
that it is not exactly a judgment, though it is tantamount to one.’ (CP
8.65, 1891; also HP 2: 899–900, 1901; CP 6.522–524, 1901; CP 5.194,
1903; MS 856: 6–8, 1911). This ‘abductiveness’ of perception is more
evident in those visual illusions of reversible figures (e.g., in the Necker
Cube) where the same visual data can be interpreted in various ways (see
CP 5.182–5.185, 1903). According to my interpretation, these reversible
figures show that, in perception, visual clues are organized by using
some deeper level interpretation (or ‘hypothesis’) that makes them under-
standable (cf. Shelley 1996; Thagard and Shelley 1997; Brogaard 1999,
136–140). This perceptual process is similar to abduction, where facts
and clues are organized anew to explain some surprising phenomena (EP
2: 287, 1903; PPM 282–283; cf. CP 7.36, c. 1907). When we see things,
we see this intepretation, so in this sense, it is di¤erent from inference
(where the conclusion is abstractly drawn or thought). But visual illusions
show that seeing is not unequivocal; in a sense it is hypothetical, depend-
ing on how we organize the whole pattern (see Hanson 1958).
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My separation of abductive inference from instinct is not intended to
suggest that abductive inference is necessarily a better model in compari-
son to abductive instinct. Quite the contrary, Peirce himself gives many
convincing arguments for the view that, in many cases, instincts are better
guides than consciously performed inferences; for example:
Most men are incapable of strong control over their minds. Their thoughts
are such as instinct, habit, association suggest, mainly. Their criticism of their
thoughts is confined to reconsideration and to asking themselves whether their
ideas seem reasonable. I do not call this reasoning: I call it instinctive reflexion.
For most purposes it is the best way to think; for instinct blunders far less than
reason. Reasoners are in danger of falling into sophistry and pedantry. Our in-
stinctive ways of thinking have become adapted to ordinary practical life, just as the
rest of our physiology has become adapted to our environment. (CP 7.606, 1903)
The guessing instinct might be more e¤ective and fruitful than rea-
soning. When Peirce describes the guessing instinct (with non-conscious
clues), he defends it with the argument that
[e]verybody knows how self-consciousness makes one awkward and may even
quite paralyze the mind. . . . At any rate my own experience is that self-
consciousness, and especially conscious e¤ort, are apt to carry me to the verge of
idiocy and that those things that I have done spontaneously were the best done.
(CP 7.45, c. 1907; see also NEM 3: 215, 1910)
Instinct can be more important if quick and practical decisions are needed
because then one does not have time for more thorough ‘scientific’ analy-
sis (CP 7.606, 1903; NEM 4: 36, 1902; MS 637: 11–12, 1909). Peirce ar-
gues that animal instincts are adapted to their purpose and are highly ac-
curate in these respects; but reasoning is not bound to immediate practical
concerns and utilities (NEM 4: 36, 1902). Reasoning is more amenable to
error, but also needed when old solutions are not enough (CP 6.497, c.
1906; CP 2.176–178, c. 1902; CP 7.380, c. 1902; NEM 4: 217).
6. The conflation of instinct and inference in Peirce’s later writings
I think there is reason to say that in his later writings Peirce never satis-
factorily resolved the relationship between instinct and inference, not
even to his own mind; that he continued to have problems finding satis-
factory justification for abduction (Fann 1970: 51–54). In his later writ-
ings, Peirce emphasized abduction as a weak form of inference, and it
needed some strengthening (Burton 2000; Paavola 2004b). Abduction
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‘merely suggests that something may be’ (CP 5.171–172, 1903); it is near
to guessing, or even the same as guessing (e.g. HP 2: 878–879, 1900; HP
2: 898–899, 1901; NEM 3: 203–204, 1911). So abduction needs some-
thing more to be a realistic model for discovery (i.e., to tell how new ideas
are generated). In real life, human beings have found good hypotheses
more e‰ciently and quickly than pure chance would allow, so there must
be an explanation how this happens. Instinct can then be seen as one pos-
sible hypothesis for explaining our success at finding fertile ideas. Peirce
himself often stated this position explicitly as a hypothesis (CP 7.39, c.
1907; CP 7.220, 1901; CP 1.121, c. 1896; MS 652: 24, 1910), so it seems
that it is only one possible explanation, and Peirce hinted that there may
be other alternative explanations (Fann 1970: 37, 54).
This instinctual strengthening of abduction surely fitted with Peirce’s
metaphysical ideas; with his synechism, agapism, and his theistic ideas.
Synechism and agapism (and also theistic arguments) gave backing to
the idea that there is some sort of a tendency in human mind to find out
true theories, whatever is the exact explanation for this tendency. There
were many similar discussions in Peirce’s time, in biology and social
theory, concerning such concepts as ‘‘instinct,’’ ‘‘reason,’’ ‘‘inference’’,
and ‘‘evolution’’, which gave background to his thoughts. But clearly it
was a problem for Peirce that logic seems here to need some backing
from psychology (see MS 637: 9–10, 1909; MS 652: 24, 1910), that is,
we have to suppose that human beings really have this instinct in order
to explain how hypotheses are abductively found.
The turn of the century is a kind of a transitional period in Peirce’s
thought concerning abductive instinct. Before this period, Peirce made a
clear separation between inference and instinct. And after that, without
making an abrupt change, Peirce more emphatically stressed the instinc-
tual nature of abduction; it seems that he always wanted to emphasize
inferential nature of abduction as well. At least in 1901 he had already
stated very clearly that instinct is an important element in explaining the
success of abduction:
[I]t is a primary hypothesis underlying all abduction that the human mind is akin
to the truth in the sense that in a finite number of guesses it will light upon the
correct hypothesis. (CP 7.220, 1901)
In 1908, when he stated that abduction (then with the name ‘retroduc-
tion’) is ‘the spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason’ (CP 6.475,
1908), he also insisted that, in order to be ‘argumentation,’ the process
must proceed upon definitely formulated premises. So, if the premises
are not explicitly formulated, it is not argumentation (in a proper sense)
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but ‘argument,’ which means ‘any process of thought reasonably tending
to produce a definite belief ’ (see CP 6.456 and CP 6.469, 1908).
On the whole, the basic argument for the need of the guessing instinct
is quite weak (see e.g., CP 7.220, 1901; HP 2: 900–901, 1901; CP 5.591,
1903). Peirce argues that we human beings could not have reached our
theories by pure chance. There simply is not enough time. So one needs
to assume some sort of an instinct that has helped us to find true theories.
And if animals have various instincts, why not to presume that we as hu-
mans have instincts for finding true theories (because this is so important
for our survival)? And, according to Peirce, it seems also that at least the
best scientists actually have this sort of an instinct for finding good hy-
potheses. I think that Peirce’s argument points out that we as human
beings must have had some way of finding good ideas and theories more
e¤ectively than by pure chance. But let us examine the argument more
closely; what evidence do we have that this is because of some sort of an
instinct? Instinct is only one possible explanation here, and a rather indef-
inite explanation. And even though it would be admitted that we humans
may have some kind of instinct, or various instincts that help us to find
good theories, why should this concern abduction as an inference? We
could also assume that theories are found with guessing instinct, but dis-
tinguish this from abductive inference. A historical question of how hu-
man beings have managed to find successful and true theories is not the
same as a question about the nature of abductive inference, or its justifi-
cation. We could argue that human beings must have a way of finding
good ideas and hypotheses more e¤ectively than by pure chance, and
still preserve the distinction between abductive inference and abductive
instinct.
7. Conclusion
Peirce’s writings are a rich source of inspiration for theories concerning
abduction and discovery. I think that his writings are like material for re-
versible figures that can be organized in various ways. Peirce’s writings
leave room, for example, for various interpretations concerning abductive
instinct. I have argued that Peirce did not resolve the relationship between
inference and instinct in a clear-cut manner in his later writings.
The interpretation that I advocate is to distinguish abductive instinct
and abductive inference, which suggests that abduction can be developed
further as a ‘pure’ form of inference: Various aspects of it can be analyzed
further, for example, the nature of its premises, the inferential relation-
ships within it, the strength and validity of it, how abductive inferences
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are used. That is, in Peircean terms, the grammar, the critic, and the
methodeutic of abductive inference should all be further examined (see
Paavola 2004b).
The proposal that abductive inference should be developed further as
a mode of inference does not mean that abductive instinct should be
neglected, quite the contrary. Peirce analyzes many phenomena under
the guessing instinct that are of interest to modern cognitive sciences,
starting with the idea that human beings can use, in their problem solv-
ing, information of which they are not conscious. Peirce, of course, did
not have at his disposal many of those conceptions that are attractive to
the modern reader from this perspective (for example the notion of ‘tacit
knowledge’, or modern conceptions of expertise). The idea of abductive
instinct could be analyzed further by using these modern notions.
In actual problem-solving situations, human beings often use a mixture
of abductive inference and abductive instinct. Consciously held premises
and reasonings interact with more vaguely noticed and controlled clues
and suggestions, and rather than using these in a linear fashion, various
pieces are combined in parallel (Thagard 2000: 2–3). Abductive instinct
is especially important when quick and spontaneous decisions are needed
on the basis of the inquirer’s previous experience. Abductive inference
gives means for analyzing and organizing the abductive search explicitly.
So, both abductive instinct and abductive inference are important when
good ideas or hypotheses are searched for.3
Notes
1. Peirce used various names for this third mode of inference throughout his long career;
Reasoning à posteriori (e.g. W 1: 180, 1865; W 1: 266–267, 1865), Hypothesis (e.g. W 1:
283, 1865; CP 1.559, 1867; HP 2: 878–879, 1900), Abduction (e.g. HP 2: 898–899, 1901;
CP 7.202, 1901; CP 5.188–189, 1903; CP 8.209, c. 1905), Presumption (e.g. CP 2.776–
777, 1902), Retroduction (CP 1.68, c. 1896; 1898; CP 6.469–6.470, 1908; CP 8.385–
8.388, 1913) (More thoroughly, see Bergman and Paavola, 2003). I use systematically
the term ‘abduction’ because it is the established term nowadays.
2. Partly published in CP 7.36–7.48, c. 1907; see also Eco and Sebeok 1983 where this
story and article is thoroughly described.
3. I would like to thank Matti Sintonen, Mats Bergman, and Hal White for insightful com-
ments on this paper. I also want to thank the Finnish Cultural Foundation for support-
ing my work with a grant.
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